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Abstract 
Camera surveillance has recently gained prominence in policy proposals on combating 
terrorism. We evaluate this instrument of counterterrorism as resting on the premise of a 
deterrence effect. Based on comparative arguments and previous evidence on crime, we 
expect camera surveillance to have a relatively smaller deterrent effect on terrorism than on 
other forms of crime. In particular, we emphasize opportunities for substitution (i.e., 
displacement effects), the interaction with media attention aspired to by terrorists, the limits 
of real-time interventions, the crowding-out of social surveillance, the risk of misguided 
profiling, and politico-economic concerns regarding the misuse of the technology. 
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I. Introduction 
Terrorist attacks are a serious threat for public security and are a challenge for both the private 
actors and public agencies involved in its provision.1 Recently, camera surveillance has 
gained prominence as a measure for counterterrorism, and public security agencies in many 
countries plan to invest large amounts of money in this technology. 
In this short paper, we propose essential questions that should be analyzed in order to 
evaluate this development in security policy. We draw on an economic approach to identify 
the relevant issues and refer to a wide spectrum of literature to inform our assessment of 
camera surveillance as an instrument in the fight against terrorism. In particular, research on 
the effectiveness of camera surveillance as a crime prevention tool provides interesting 
insights. 
Camera surveillance or closed-circuit television (CCTV)2, as it is often called, has 
received attention in the debate on terrorism policy after the London bombings in 2005.3 On 7 
July 2005, three bombs exploded on three underground trains, and one bomb exploded on a 
bus in the city of London, killing 52 commuters and the four alleged perpetrators.4 The 
identification of the four suicide bombers strongly relied on CCTV footage.5 
Two weeks after the first terrorist event on 21 July 2005, there were another four 
attempted bomb attacks on the London public transport system (British Broadcasting 
Corporation 2005b, Rasmussen 2005). This time, however, only the detonators of the bombs 
exploded. Still, public transport in the London area came to a complete standstill (id.). 
                                                
1 In the economic analysis of terrorism (see, e.g., Frey 2004, Enders and Sandler 2006), different 
approaches have been developed to estimate its economic costs (for a survey, see Frey et al. 2007).    
In a specific application regarding the United Kingdom and France, the life satisfaction approach is 
introduced to evaluate the psychic cost of terrorism or the welfare gains from security in the absence 
of terrorism (Frey et al. 2009). 
2 According to Goold (2004, p.12), CCTV is defined as “a system in which a number of video cameras 
are connected in a closed circuit loop, with the images produced being sent to a central television 
monitor or recorded.” One can categorize active (with people watching the recorded images in real-
time) versus passive (only recording), and overt (obviously visible) versus covert (within protective 
shells or domes) systems – a variety of hybrid forms being implemented as well. 
3 In the United States, CCTV as a measure for safeguarding public areas against ‘terrorist’ activities 
gained considerable publicity in the aftermath of the ‘D.C.-area sniper’ case in 2002 (Wolfe 2002). 
4 For the events of July 7, see, e.g., the BBC’s in-depth report (British Broadcasting Corporation 
2005a). 
5 Official reports relating to this London bombing were compiled by the Greater London Authority 
(2006), the House of Commons (2006), and the Intelligence and Security Committee (2006). 
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Immediately after the terrorist attempts, CCTV images of four suspects were released, which 
were used to help arrest the perpetrators (British Broadcasting Corporation 2005c). 
As a result of these London events, agents on the demand- and the supply-side have 
requested and pledged investment in camera surveillance for the public transport system. For 
instance, a legal studies research paper from the Center for Health and Homeland Security at 
the University of Maryland states: “The foremost method of deterring and responding to those 
kind of [terrorist] attacks is the use of CCTV. The price tag is high, but worth it” 
(Greenberger 2006, p. 8). In the same vein, the French Interior Minister Alliot-Marie 
announced: “France will triple its number of video surveillance cameras by 2009 as part of its 
fight against terrorism and street crime” (Reuters 2007). 
In the United Kingdom in 2009, large-scale advertisement campaigns encouraged the 
population to report suspicious objects or activities potentially related to terrorism. 
Subsequent to this, the CCTV installations themselves conjecturally became terrorist targets. 
An ad shows a quiet street scene with people and the accompanying text: “A bomb won’t go 
off there because weeks before a shopper reported someone studying the CCTV camera” 
(Metropolitan Police Service 2009). In the light of this development, the simple curiosity of 
passers-by regarding CCTV installations is likely to be interpreted as an indicting act. This is 
a noticeable outcome, as actual terrorists have never been detected spying out CCTV cameras. 
A series of immediate questions arises. What theory underlies the proposal in support of 
camera surveillance as an instrument of counterterrorism? What is the evidence for its 
effectiveness? What can be learned from the experience of CCTV being used as a crime 
prevention method? Are there differences involved in using CCTV as part of an anti-terrorism 
instrument and do these matter? Finally, what are the possible side effects of an 
counterterrorism policy based on CCTV? 
In our subsequent discussion, we offer some analysis and input that should help address 
these questions. In Section II, the deterrence hypothesis is presented as the theoretical basis 
supporting the use of CCTV as a counterterrorism measure. We confront this hypothesis with 
a review of the empirical evidence in Section III. Potential (unintended) side effects of CCTV, 
such as displacement effects, are discussed in Sections IV. We conclude with an assessment 
of CCTV surveillance as a response to terrorism in Section V. 
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II. The Deterrence Hypothesis 
Camera surveillance is probably the most rapidly spreading and, at the same time, one of the 
most controversial instruments in security policy today. This fast-developing technology 
basically enables a ubiquitous surveillance of public and private space, and security agents 
benefit from its enhanced capabilities for detecting or retracing criminal activities. Camera 
surveillance signifies (i) a general extension of public surveillance systems and (ii) a shift 
from direct, personal or print surveillance to remote, electronically transmitted, and even 
computer-enhanced self-monitoring, visual surveillance.6 
By triggering perceptual mechanisms in potential offenders, CCTV aims to increase the 
perceived risk of being detected, captured and possibly arrested. This trigger should raise the 
cost of a contemplated offence in the mind of a (limitedly) rational potential offender, be the 
intended act of a criminal or terrorist nature. Focusing on the surveillance and deterrence 
function of CCTV, the economics of terrorism based on the traditional economic approach to 
crime implies that the dissemination of camera surveillance enhances control capacities, and 
leads to a partial replacement of human capital by technological investments, thereby 
increasing the productivity and efficiency of policing. CCTV-systems are thus expected to 
promote the substitution of legal and decent behavior for illegal and deviant behavior, and 
thus ultimately reduce terrorism in the monitored area.7 
Recorded images are also utilizable ex post as they support terrorist scene investigations 
or serve as proof material. Consequently, this new electronic surveillance technique is 
expected to have positive first-order effects both on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
security production: It enables broader detection capabilities at equal costs, thereby resulting 
in a decline in terrorism and an increase in public security.8 
                                                
6 Second generation CCTV accelerates this process by providing digitalized images that can be 
automatically processed by recognition software, increasing the scope of surveillance and potentially 
also reducing monitoring costs (see, e.g., Norris and Armstrong 1999; Surette 2005). 
7 Of course, the primary objective of CCTV is often seen in the reduction in crime and public disorder. 
Recently, the effects of CCTV on public fear of crime or feelings of security have also gained interest 
(see, e.g., Deisman 2003 as well as Gill and Spriggs 2005). The effect on civil liberties and individual 
privacy is another prominent issue. It is not discussed here (but see, e.g., Cavoukian 2008). 
8 Other potential benefits of CCTV, such as supporting the provision of medical assistance or 
facilitating place management and information gathering (e.g., for marketing purposes) are beyond the 
scope of this study. For a short discussion of some of these issues, see Ratcliffe (2006). 
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Analyses of criminal activity indicate various mechanisms by which CCTV possibly 
deters terrorist activity: 
o Deterrence of terrorist behavior by signaling an elevated risk of apprehension; i.e., the 
costs of terrorism rise if CCTV is perceived as reducing the time available for 
committing attacks; 
o Detection, identification and possible incapacitation (arrest) of offenders as well as the 
identification of potential witnesses (who might otherwise be reluctant to come forward) 
are the potential benefits of CCTV used uniquely as an evidence-gathering tool against 
terrorism; 
o Effective deployment (and intervention) of security personnel or police to critical 
situations, thereby supporting the apprehension of suspects and providing back-up 
security for police officer safety; 
o CCTV might signal the force of a concerted political offensive against terrorism, 
thereby encouraging the active commitment of law-abiding citizens and personal 
surveillance (by stimulating moral courage, community pride and cohesion). 
There is also the possibility that the above-mentioned terrorism-reducing benefits of CCTV 
extend beyond the areas directly monitored by cameras (referred to as a ‘diffusion of 
benefits’). This can happen if potential offenders are aware of the presence of CCTV but 
unaware of its capabilities or the covered range. 
III. Evidence on Camera Surveillance Effectiveness 
The existing evidence regarding CCTV effectiveness is focused purely on the prevention of 
crime. We are not aware of any study that has tried to empirically assess CCTV effectiveness 
in the prevention of terrorism. The evidence backing CCTV effectiveness as a situational 
crime prevention measure is mixed, to say the least.9 In the following, this evidence is briefly 
summarized and commented on in order to outline the issues that need to be considered when 
evaluating CCTV in the context of terrorism. 
The empirical key findings regarding the effect of CCTV on crime can be summarized 
as follows: 
First, most of the studies that show CCTV to have a restraining effect on criminal 
activity (i) were carried out in the United Kingdom and (ii) concentrated on camera 
                                                
9 For surveys see Welsh and Farrington (2003, 2009) or Gill and Spriggs (2005). 
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surveillance as applied to car parks. Moreover, the vast majority of existing CCTV 
evaluations originate from the United Kingdom. Almost all studies from other geographic 
areas (such as the United States or Scandinavia) do not provide clear evidence of it having a 
moderating effect on crime. 
Second, the effect of CCTV depends upon the type of crime considered: By affecting 
the expected costs of criminal behavior incurred by the criminal, this type of electronic visual 
surveillance seems to be more effective at combating planned or premeditated criminal 
behavior such as property offences (such as car crime and, a bit more ambiguously, burglary, 
simple theft, shoplifting, and arson) than at preventing emotionally driven, impulsive 
violence. This might explain why, in general, CCTV works better in car parks than on public 
squares and in broad mass transit systems. 
Third, the location under CCTV surveillance is relevant to its effectiveness. While 
crime appears to be manageable (to some extent) by CCTV in small, enclosed or at least well-
defined areas with limited and controlled access points (such as parking lots and car parks), 
there is hardly any significant evidence regarding highly frequented public spaces with open 
access (such as ‘hot spots’ in city centers). Interestingly, the latter areas are exactly the ones 
where the application of CCTV is currently spreading most rapidly. However, in most 
contexts in which it has been implemented so far, CCTV is, at least, unlikely to aggravate the 
problem of crime. 
Fourth, the way CCTV systems are operated and managed influences their effectiveness 
(Gill and Spriggs 2005, Cavoukian 2008): Factors like the number and types of cameras (pan, 
tilt, zoom, multiplexing; resolution; fixed versus re-deployable), camera coverage (density) of 
the area, control room operations (staffing; 24-hour active versus passive monitoring; 
implemented software solution), system management skills, formulated objectives of the 
scheme, and the involvement of the police and other law enforcement agents all have an 
influence on CCTV effectiveness.10 However, these insights are often based on limited 
evidence. It is still open to future research to help identify the features that make CCTV 
schemes a success or a failure (Deisman 2003). Information on these important 
implementation aspects should be provided by future CCTV studies, especially as these 
systems and their operation need not be static but are modified and upgraded from time to 
                                                
10 For example, as long as first-generation CCTV systems with relatively low-resolution standards are 
implemented, only very few crimes are detectable ex post. Bowcott (2008) and McSmith (2008) report 
only three per cent of London street robberies being solved by CCTV. 
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time. For instance, in a recent study, the effectiveness of CCTV in 84 Stockholm subway 
stations is linked to the immediate possibility of police intervention (Priks 2009). The 
introduction of CCTV is found to systematically reduce crime in city-center stations that are 
in the vicinity of police stations, but not in peripheral parts of the metro system. 
Fifth, CCTV generally has an ex post investigative utility, at least as long as the 
recordings are stored for sufficiently long time periods and the relevant visual information is 
easily searchable. However, there is also evidence of an experience-based adaptation in 
criminal behavior patterns.11 This undermines the suitability of CCTV as a crime-prevention 
and evidence-gathering tool. 
A general caveat casts a shadow over the evidence on CCTV effectiveness (i.e., there 
are various methodological difficulties in demonstrating a causal relationship between CCTV 
and criminal behavior). Even though natural field experiments seem technically feasible, we 
are not aware of any institution that has chosen this approach to understanding the 
consequences of camera surveillance. Instead, researchers have had to deal with the 
challenges of evaluating non-experimental data. 
Importantly, omitted variables pose a challenge. In addition to CCTV, often other 
situational crime prevention measures are applied or other conditions affecting illicit behavior 
change simultaneously with the introduction of CCTV. A relevant example is the deployment 
of police patrols. The intensity of area policing may change over time, and potentially 
systematically, where the application of CCTV serves either as a substitute or as a 
complement within a new security scheme. If third variables that affect the outcome variable 
are correlated with the use of CCTV, the estimated correlation for CCTV is biased. If the 
omitted variables act simultaneously, the correlation for CCTV measures a net effect of 
several security measures.  
Another challenge is that the introduction of CCTV (i.e., the intervention) might not be 
independent of the phenomenon that is to be explained; e.g., the level of illicit behavior. The 
use of CCTV might then easily be positively correlated with crime in cross-section analyses. 
A similar bias may result in a time-series perspective. CCTV schemes are installed 
subsequent to intensified episodes of criminal activity. Depending on the evaluation 
framework, biases in either direction might emerge. Regression towards the mean (i.e., an 
                                                
11 Edmunds et al. (1996) provide interesting evidence on tactical displacement in Australia, where drug 
markets continued to operate in the presence of CCTV by adapting certain operating practices. 
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extreme level of crime in an area in one period is followed by a moderate level of crime in the 
next period) might spuriously indicate a deterrence effect after the installation of CCTV. If 
the exogenous effect on crime, that also provoked the adoption of CCTV, remains, CCTV 
schemes are spuriously associated with higher crime rates.  
Finally, the use of CCTV might directly affect the dependent variable if there is a 
statistical recording effect. If CCTV footage is simultaneously used to counteract illicit 
behavior and to improve its measurement, no conclusions on the deterrent effect can be 
drawn. 
In order to permit an evaluation of the consequences of CCTV schemes, future 
implementations need to be carefully considered with regard to the context in which they are 
implemented as well as the objectives they aim to achieve. A high-quality evaluation design 
must be developed ex ante. This includes the possibility of crime mapping before the 
introduction of CCTV as well as in long follow-up periods. Moreover, circumstances that 
potentially affect the effective use of CCTV should be recorded and observed over the entire 
evaluation period. A better understanding of the circumstances is also necessary if the insights 
from crime prevention are to be transferred to terrorism prevention. 
IV. Displacement Effects and Other (Unintended) Side Effects 
a) Diverse Displacement Effects 
CCTV is expected to deter terrorism by providing potential terrorists with an incentive to 
adopt legitimate methods for pursuing their goals and renounce illegal ones. However, the 
terrorist’s response to CCTV is not clearly predictable, and substitution effects might occur 
that are not only unintended but also unwanted. In the economic analysis of terrorism, the 
substitution of targets is a well-known phenomenon that has been well-documented with 
regard to tightened security measures at airports (see, e.g., Enders and Sandler 2006). 
The introduction of metal detectors has proven successful in substantially reducing 
skyjacking (id.). However, aggregate terrorist activity has not decreased due to this 
improvement. Instead, only shifts (displacement effects) in the type of terrorist attack have 
taken place in response to changes in relative costs: from skyjackings to hijackings of other 
means of transportation as well as hostage takings. 
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With regard to CCTV, we are not aware of any scientifically documented substitution 
effect relating to terrorism. We, therefore, again refer to crime when discussing the 
substitution issue, where the term displacement is generally used. 
So far, the side effect most dominantly discussed in the literature on CCTV is the 
possibility that territorial (or spatial) displacement might result from electronically monitoring 
specific locations, and, implicitly, from not monitoring others. As Norris and Armstrong 
(1999, p. 92) have pointed out, “anticipatory conformity may be a strictly temporal and spatial 
phenomenon, with those individuals with deviant intentions shifting the time and place of 
their activities to outside the camera’s gaze.” 
Crime then eventually shifts to more peripheral public and private areas that are not 
monitored (spatial, territorial, or geographic displacement), where negative effects arising 
from associated externalities may not only alternate, but also aggravate.12 Moreover, an 
adverse selection process can crowd people with an ambivalent attitude towards social order 
(and unwilling to exercise social control) out of monitored areas and thereby lead to smaller 
regroupings – a micro-regional segregation in the social composition of the public – thereby 
worsening the problem of surveillance gaps in camera-free places. 
Temporal displacement may also occur if cameras do not operate around the clock or if 
there is insufficient street lighting around the cameras at night. Besides territorial and 
temporal displacement, Reppetto (1976) identifies the possibility of ‘tactical’ (change in 
method), ‘target’ (change in victim), and ‘functional’ (change in type of crime) displacement.  
Although previous literature views displacement effects almost unequivocally as 
negative, they need not be unintended. Some displacement of criminal, illegitimate or ‘anti-
social’ behavior to less centrally located areas can be a politically intended outcome. Intended 
and unintended displacement should therefore be differentiated in any thorough discussion of 
CCTV. 
There is some evidence for a territorial displacement of crime due to CCTV.13 “[B]ut – 
as is the case with the general crime prevention literature – the amount of crime displaced 
                                                
12 Bulos (1995, p. 9) reported that the use of CCTV to revive a town center resulted in “young people 
being displaced by town centre improvement schemes to (…) environments which are unsafe for them 
such as alleyways and subways.” 
13 Brown’s (1995) evaluation of the schemes in the city centers of Birmingham and Newcastle-upon-
Tyne show some displacement. Squires’ (1998) study on Ilford, England, and Mazerolle et al. (2002) 
on the Findlay market scheme in Cincinnati, Ohio (USA), also report displacement effects in the 
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rarely matches the amount of crime reduced. There is usually a net gain for crime prevention” 
(Ratcliffe 2006, p. 15). Moreover, the identification of displacement effects is a 
methodological challenge. The measurement of territorial displacement (as well as of the 
territorial diffusion of benefits) requires that at least two control areas are examined: one 
adjacent and one non-adjacent (but still comparable) control area. Here, changes in crime in 
the adjacent area relative to the non-adjacent area are considered as being the result of 
substitution behavior. Changes in crime in the treatment area relative to the non-adjacent area 
are interpreted in terms of deterrence. 
Regarding technological improvements, such as computer-enhanced or ‘intelligent’ 
surveillance, Surette (2005) supposes that these are likely to stimulate spatial displacement as 
computer vision systems become more effective in detecting and identifying criminals. 
Depending on the software installed and the visual recognition software used, various forms 
of tactical or target displacement, as new and non-predicted forms of behavior are likely to 
appear in the future. At the same time, a less error-prone ‘intelligent’ surveillance system is 
expected to enhance the diffusion of benefits. 
b) An ‘Arms Race’ 
One possible consequence of crime-shifts due to displacement is the emergence of a social 
dilemma triggering an ‘arms race’. Activists, neighborhood politicians, communities, cities 
and even countries face a difficult choice when deciding to make CCTV investments. Many 
interested parties might prefer not to employ CCTV and, instead, be willing to tolerate a 
certain level of crime and risk of terrorism. Others, again, speculate that the posture of being 
tough on crime and terrorism shifts part of the problem to other areas. Moreover, these parties 
recognize that they are affected by investment decisions made when crime and terrorism are 
displaced. They realize that they are obliged to invest in CCTV in order to avoid being losers. 
If these motivational forces are strong, they will lead to over-investment in cameras and an 
excessive use of electronic surveillance, which finally results in a supra-optimal level of 
surveillance (and, thus, in a negative-sum game). Analysts have repeatedly observed (Davies 
1996, Nunn 2003) that cities were willing to install CCTV systems simply because 
neighboring communities did so. Of course, this is not per se evidence of an arms race as 
implementation might be due to mimicking behavior in the process of policy diffusion. 
                                                                                                                                                   
context of city centers. Flight et al. (2003) find some displacement as well as some immediate 
diffusion of benefits into other areas. About the same number of studies measures little or no amount 
of displacement. 
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c) CCTV and the Media – A Vicious Circle 
Media coverage provides another reason for the expansion of CCTV beyond any rationale 
based on its scientifically established effectiveness in reducing crime or terrorism. In an ever-
closer relationship between CCTV and visual media (television, world wide web, 
newspapers), a ‘feedback loop’ might result and further stimulate growth in CCTV 
surveillance. The CCTV images shown daily on television news programs cause public 
anxiety, elevate public perception of risk regarding crime and terrorism, and in turn, 
encourage public demand for extending CCTV systems (Jermyn 2004, Surette 2005). 
d) Information Overflow 
The prolific growth in the number of cameras also incorporates a risk that the enormous 
quantities of visual date provided will exceed the evaluation capacities necessary for its 
analysis. An information overload can occur either if the proportion of screens that can be 
watched live falls far short of the scenes under surveillance (Patel 1994) or if the amount of 
data exceeds the storage space capacity available for the time span required. While the first 
problem primarily undermines the ex ante deterrence function, the second aspect also erodes 
the capability of CCTV images to provide ex post detection and evidence. 
Specifically, there is a constraint regarding the number of monitors that can reasonably 
be watched by a single person: Usually, it is proposed that no more than two screens should 
be simultaneously watched per control room employee (Brown 1995, Surette 2005). In any 
case, the issue of boredom is also closely related to data swamping and can lead to 
insufficient processing of the available visual information. 
e) Negative Incentives for Taking Private Self-Prevention Measures 
CCTV might give individuals a biased and false sense of security and thereby cause potential 
victims to become more vulnerable. If individuals neglect or under-invest in private 
precautionary measures (e.g., lower subjective alertness and verbally provocative or abusive 
behavior) in the presence of CCTV, a moral hazard problem arises, and prevention costs are 
externalized. An incentive problem may arise where people wear more conspicuous, 
expensive jewelry or do not walk in groups when out at night (Welsh and Farrington 2003). 
f) Crowding-out of Social Surveillance 
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Apart from undermining private (self-) prevention incentives, social control can be crowded 
out, diminishing moral courage, undermining social cohesion or even aggravating tendencies 
of individuation. Ultimately, the ‘electronic eye on the street’ (Fyfe and Bannister 1998) 
might corrode informal guardianship in public spaces, which was coined by Jacobs (1961) as 
‘spontaneous’ or ‘natural surveillance’. 
Alternatively, CCTV coverage might also serve to “encourage broader based public 
interactions between classes, races, and ages by increasing a shared sense of safety” (Surette 
2005, p.165) and thereby stimulate social guardianship. So far, very little advance has been 
made in the empirical analysis of the social consequences of electronic surveillance 
techniques, and, therefore, no reliable conclusions have yet been drawn. Surette’s (2006) 
study suggests that the installation of CCTV does not diminish informal citizen guardianship. 
g) Profiling and Discrimination 
Security camera footage examination necessarily has a selective nature. Accordingly, control 
room operators and judges possess a certain degree of discretionary authority with regard to 
the outcomes of comprehensive monitoring. In particular, there is a higher likelihood of 
profiling, stereotyping and discrimination occurring in the absence of formalized imperatives 
and specific guidelines. The question of who is authorized to control CCTV-generated content 
is, therefore, also a central issue determining the system’s public acceptance (Surette 2005). 
Williams and Johnstone (2000) observe instances of systematic, selective racial and 
socio-economic profiling by CCTV system operators who aim their cameras at social groups 
that they subjectively judge as being high-risk or more likely to behave defiantly, especially 
young black males. Discriminatory CCTV monitoring and a tendency towards racial and 
ethnic profiling in evidence gathering and law enforcement were also observed by Ditton and 
Short (1999), Norris and Armstrong (1999), and Norris (2001). 
A tacit use of markers based on some sort of profiling potentially leads to a self-
fulfilling prophecy. By keeping some people with specific characteristics under close 
surveillance, these people are more likely to be observed with deviant behavior 
(independently of whether they have a higher base rate for some norm violation). This process 
reinforces biases against people who share the specific characteristics; this might be 
particularly relevant for minor offenses that can be observed with CCTV. 
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In contrast, profiling might be largely ineffective if applied to terrorism suspects. 
Particular shortcuts to identify suspicious individuals are only available ex post or recognized 
with hindsight. Moreover, targeted people or terrorist organizations are expected to be 
conscious of and react to the risk of intensive scrutiny; for instance, terrorist leaders now 
recruit more women instead of men for possible future suicide bomber attacks. 
V. Assessment of CCTV Surveillance as a Response to Terrorist Threats 
Camera surveillance as an instrument of counterterrorism rests on the premise of a deterrent 
effect that motivates potential terrorists to abstain from illegal activities when pursuing their 
political and religious goals. Again, this may happen through ex ante identification of 
suspicious persons of packages or by aiding ex post identification and apprehension of 
perpetrators. While CCTV footage played a prominent role in the identification of the men 
alleged to be responsible for the first London bombing in July 2005 and in the arrest of the 
men involved in the attempted attacks two weeks later14, no systematic evidence exists on 
whether terrorist activity is actually deterred by CCTV.15 The review of the evidence on 
camera surveillance as a crime prevention tool suggests that CCTV effectiveness is rather 
situation-specific. However, the conditions for its successful application have not yet been 
systematically explored. 
Based on the economic analysis of illegal behavior, we expect CCTV to have less of a 
deterrence effect in the case of terrorism than in the case of street crime. Surveillance appears 
less effective where the substitution possibilities for terrorist attack targets seem almost 
unlimited. Property crime targeting lucrative gains becomes relatively less attractive under 
surveillance. In the case of suicide bombers, any increased risk of apprehension due to CCTV 
only acts as a deterrent where a potential failure of the attack is considered. Otherwise, the 
perpetrators are “dead anyway” and potential ex post identification is irrelevant to crime 
prevention. 
                                                
14 CCTV started to play an initiating role as a measure of counterterrorism already in the aftermath of 
the Irish Republican Army’s attack on Bishopgate (in the City of London). This lead to the 
introduction of a vast traffic CCTV network, the so-called ‘Ring of Steel’, recording licence plates on 
nearly every vehicle entering central London (Norris and McCahill 2006). 
15 However, the recorded images and the subsequent identification allowed police to trace their 
movements on the day of the attack and, ultimately, to identify their point of origin and bomb-making 
equipment in Leeds (UK). Interestingly, this reconstruction of the terrorists’ behavioural patterns 
required the inspection of even more CCTV footage from other areas far away from the ones targets 
(Steel 2005). 
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In contrast, camera footage increases public attention to the terrorists’ activities and 
might facilitate the attribution of attacks to specific terrorist networks. Terrorists 
paradoxically often actively exploit both of these aspects: They choose locations and targets 
as well as the timing of attacks in order to generate as much media attention as possible (for 
the relationship between the media and terrorists, see, e.g., Hoffman 1998 and Wilkinson 
2000). Accordingly, targets under camera surveillance might become more and not less 
attractive. 
A further argument regards the capacity of CCTV to enable real-time intervention prior 
to an attack. This argument depends on an assumption that terrorist behavior is about as self-
evident as the technical problems arising in production processes monitored by CCTV. 
However, terrorists are careful to avoid suspicion by means of covert behavior; here, an 
interpretation of non-routine behavior is highly ambiguous and complex. Behavior is often 
only declared to be clearly suspicious in the light of hindsight. 
Moreover, the possible side effects of an anti-terrorism policy based on CCTV have to 
be considered. First, if a strong positive link is evident between CCTV and public perceptions 
of the terrorist threat, this will imply that CCTV exacerbates rather assuages public fear. 
According to Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003), people are inclined to predict worst-case 
scenarios and are susceptible to anxiety owing to reports of anomalous events in other risk 
perception contexts. The hindsight bias and embeddedness effects are particularly evident for 
terrorism-risk perception. Downes-Le Guin and Hoffman (1993) contend that the probabilities 
accorded to expectations of terrorism are significantly higher than those accorded to other 
life-threatening acts. If the likelihood of a terrorist attack is presented as an immediate threat 
(as in the UK ad campaign described in the introduction) and even linked to people critically 
studying CCTV, this is likely to increase general suspicion and undermine communal trust in 
fellow citizens. 
Second, the expanded application of CCTV to the field for terrorism prevention can 
probably partly be explained by its limited success in the field of crime prevention. This 
expansion of  CCTV demands that the potential (mis-)uses that are beyond its designated 
function are carefully considered. In particular, there is the temptation to use the technology 
to deal with less serious offences,16 even though the use of CCTV on public ground for 
investigatory purposes is restricted to the specific function of crime and terrorism prevention 
                                                
16 Some cases have been reported, e.g., in the BBC News (British Broadcasting Corporation 2008) in 
an article entitled “Spy law ‘used in dog fouling war’”. 
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in many countries (e.g., the 2000 Regulation of Investigatory Power Act in the United 
Kingdom). 
The latter arguments highlight the politico-economic considerations that have to be 
taken into account when evaluating CCTV. It is difficult to explain the prolific diffusion of 
CCTV as being the result of demand-side, evidence based optimal policy implementation. 
This development has rather been a consequence of the strong supply-side influence of the 
private security technology industry. After September 11, the security industry was given the 
opportunity to sell its products to the police and other state security units that had benefited 
from massively increased budgets.17 This entailed that CCTV systems had to be standardized 
and modernized so that they could be integrated and centrally controlled (Webster 2009). On 
the demand side, the bureaucracy responsible for security was committed to expanding the 
scope of CCTV surveillance. Actual or potential terrorist incidences justified calls for 
increased monitoring. The sale of surveillance systems became subject to a ratchet effect, 
owing to the innumerable possible targets for terrorist attacks, and the associated security 
gaps. 
There is another – more fundamental – public choice aspect challenging previous 
assessments of CCTV policies. This is the implicit assumption of a benevolent ‘CCTV 
operator’. While political actors who are held accountable in a democratic process have 
incentives to use surveillance for the benefit of their constituency, this is less clear in a 
corrupt system with weak democratic institutions. The elite in power can exploit CCTV 
footage to fight their political opponents or critics of the regime who are branded subversives 
or even terrorists. This aspect must also be taken into account when CCTV technology is 
delivered to regimes in the fight against terrorism; regimes that are willing to use any 
available means to maintain their political power. 
In our view, in order to achieve a successful implementation of CCTV, it is essential 
that all the aspects specifically influencing its efficacy as an anti-terrorism device should first 
be carefully analyzed and compared with alternative measures of anti-terrorism policy (see, 
e.g., Frey and Luechinger 2003 and Enders and Sandler 2006). The various measures should 
be compared both in terms of their effectiveness and the costs that they incur in providing 
public security. 
                                                
17 According to Haggerty and Gazso (2005, p. 169), “September 11th provided a convenient 
opportunity for the security establishment to lobby for increased surveillance, despite lingering 
questions about whether such devices can achieve their professed goals.” 
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